



Large- scale sequencing of SARS- CoV-2 genomes from 
one region allows detailed epidemiology and enables local 
outbreak management
Andrew J. Page1,*,†, Alison E. Mather1,2†, Thanh Le- Viet1, Emma J. Meader3, Nabil- Fareed Alikhan1, Gemma L. Kay1, 
Leonardo de Oliveira Martins1, Alp Aydin1, David J. Baker1, Alexander J. Trotter1,2, Steven Rudder1, Ana P. Tedim1,4, 
Anastasia Kolyva1,3, Rachael Stanley3, Muhammad Yasir1, Maria Diaz1, Will Potter3, Claire Stuart3, Lizzie Meadows1, 
Andrew Bell1, Ana Victoria Gutierrez1, Nicholas M. Thomson1, Evelien M. Adriaenssens1, Tracey Swingler2, Rachel 
A. J. Gilroy1, Luke Griffith2, Dheeraj K. Sethi3, Dinesh Aggarwal5,6,7,8, Colin S. Brown5, Rose K. Davidson2, Robert 
A. Kingsley1,2, Luke Bedford9, Lindsay J. Coupland3, Ian G. Charles1,2, Ngozi Elumogo1,3, John Wain1,2, Reenesh Prakash3, 
Mark A. Webber1,2, S. J. Louise Smith10, Meera Chand5, Samir Dervisevic3, Justin O’Grady1,2 and The COVID-19 Genomics 
UK (COG- UK) Consortium
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Page et al., Microbial Genomics 2021;7:000589
DOI 10.1099/mgen.0.000589
000589 © 2021 The Authors
This is an open- access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The Microbiology Society waived the open access fees for this article.
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has spread rapidly throughout the world. In the UK, the initial peak was in April 2020; in the county 
of Norfolk (UK) and surrounding areas, which has a stable, low- density population, over 3200 cases were reported between 
March and August 2020. As part of the activities of the national COVID-19 Genomics Consortium (COG- UK) we undertook whole 
genome sequencing of the SARS- CoV-2 genomes present in positive clinical samples from the Norfolk region. These samples 
were collected by four major hospitals, multiple minor hospitals, care facilities and community organizations within Norfolk 
and surrounding areas. We combined clinical metadata with the sequencing data from regional SARS- CoV-2 genomes to under-
stand the origins, genetic variation, transmission and expansion (spread) of the virus within the region and provide context 
nationally. Data were fed back into the national effort for pandemic management, whilst simultaneously being used to assist 
local outbreak analyses. Overall, 1565 positive samples (172 per 100 000 population) from 1376 cases were evaluated; for 140 
cases between two and six samples were available providing longitudinal data. This represented 42.6 % of all positive samples 
identified by hospital testing in the region and encompassed those with clinical need, and health and care workers and their 
families. In total, 1035 cases had genome sequences of sufficient quality to provide phylogenetic lineages. These genomes 
belonged to 26 distinct global lineages, indicating that there were multiple separate introductions into the region. Furthermore, 
100 genetically distinct UK lineages were detected demonstrating local evolution, at a rate of ~2 SNPs per month, and multiple 
co- occurring lineages as the pandemic progressed. Our analysis: identified a discrete sublineage associated with six care facili-
ties; found no evidence of reinfection in longitudinal samples; ruled out a nosocomial outbreak; identified 16 lineages in key 
workers which were not in patients, indicating infection control measures were effective; and found the D614G spike protein 
mutation which is linked to increased transmissibility dominates the samples and rapidly confirmed relatedness of cases in an 
outbreak at a food processing facility. The large- scale genome sequencing of SARS- CoV-2- positive samples has provided valu-
able additional data for public health epidemiology in the Norfolk region, and will continue to help identify and untangle hidden 
transmission chains as the pandemic evolves.
DATA SUMMARY
Raw reads are deposited in the European Nucleotide Archive, 
and individual accession numbers are listed in Table S1 (avail-
able in the online version of this article). Consensus sequences 
are deposited with GISAID (Global Initiative on Sharing All 
Influenza Data), and individual accession numbers are listed 
in Table S1. The data can be visualized in MicroReact https:// 
beta. microreact. org/ project/ 8HsL 3eyA 16Ws jtym hvbbEa- 
cog- uk- 2021- 03- 18- uk- sars- cov- 2. Bioinformatics pipelines 
used to process the data are available from https:// github. 
com/ quadram- institute- bioscience/ ncov2019- artic- nf/ tree/ 
qib which were adapted from https:// github. com/ connor- lab/ 
ncov2019- artic- nf. Additional metadata, trees and alignments 
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2019, a new coronavirus- related disease 
(COVID-19) was first reported in Wuhan, China [1]; the 
causal agent was identified as the novel human coronavirus, 
SARS- CoV-2. Since then, SARS- CoV-2 has spread globally 
leading to 120 million confirmed infections and 2.7 million 
deaths (as of 17 March 2021) [2]. Two risk factors are associ-
ated with higher mortality: sex, as males are at higher risk 
than females; and age, as older age groups are at substantially 
higher risk [3].
Whole genome sequencing provides high- resolution data that 
enable investigation of pathogen evolution and population 
structure [4]. When combined with robust epidemiological 
data, it is possible to gain insights into SARS- CoV-2 origins 
[5], transmission (both global [6] and local [7]) and responses 
to control measures [8]. Since the start of the pandemic, 
sequencing efforts and data sharing have facilitated tracking 
of the pandemic [9], identifying multiple independent virus 
introductions into different countries [6]. The ability to 
assign identifiers rapidly to groups of samples that are related 
is essential in public health, as demonstrated for influenza 
[10]. These identifiers can be formulated in different ways: 
from conserved sequences identified by multi- locus sequence 
typing [11], by assigning SNP addresses [12]; or, in the case of 
SARS- CoV-2, through the assignment of lineages [13].
The COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG- UK) consortium [14] 
is a UK- wide public health surveillance initiative comprising 
nearly 20 organizations from universities, research institutes 
and public health agencies that was created to generate and 
analyse large- scale SARS- CoV-2 sequencing datasets to 
understand virus evolution, transmission and spread in the 
UK. These data allow detailed insight into the course of the 
pandemic at the country, county and individual institution 
level. It was through large- scale analysis of SARS- CoV-2 
genomes that evidence of a mutation (D614G) in the spike 
protein was revealed; it is likely that this mutation is respon-
sible for increased transmissibility of the virus [15].
For the Norfolk region, we established a robust, rapid 
sequencing pipeline for SARS- CoV-2. Weekly sequencing 
data were fed back into the national effort for pandemic 
management, whilst simultaneously being used to assist 
local outbreak analyses. Here we describe the sequencing 
of genomes present in 1565 SARS- CoV-2 samples from 
1376 cases, collected between March and August 2020. This 
represented 42.6 % of all cases in the local population and 
included those with a clinical need, and key workers (such as 
healthcare, care and police) and their families. For context, 
at the end of the study period (27 August 2020), only five 
countries (UK, Australia, Spain, India and the USA) out of 
103 countries had sequenced more SARS- CoV-2 genomes 
than had been sequenced in Norfolk for this paper. We used 
these data to investigate the genetic and epidemiological 
characteristics of the COVID-19 pandemic in the stable, low- 
density population of Norfolk and surrounding areas, UK. 
Our objectives were to use these sequence data to understand 
the evolution and spread of the virus locally, adding context 
Impact Statement
Genomic lineages of SARS- CoV-2 can be used to track 
progression of the pandemic on an international scale. We 
undertook whole genome sequencing of the SARS- CoV-2 
genomes present in positive clinical samples from one 
region. We combined clinical metadata sequencing data 
to understand the origins, genetic variation, transmission 
and expansion of the virus within the region and provide 
context nationally in the UK. In total, 42.6 % of all positive 
samples identified by hospital testing were sequenced. 
The large- scale genome sequencing of SARS- CoV-2- 
positive samples has provided valuable additional data 
for public health epidemiology in the Norfolk region, and 
will continue to help identify and untangle hidden trans-
mission chains as the pandemic evolves.
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to the national and global data, and to evaluate the role of 
rapid whole- genome sequencing for outbreak analysis in this 
setting.
Our analysis: identified a sublineage associated with six care 
facilities; found no evidence of reinfection in longitudinal 
samples; ruled out a nosocomial outbreak; identified 16 line-
ages in key workers which were not in patients, indicating 
infection control measures were effective; and found the 
D614G spike protein mutation which is linked to increased 
transmissibility dominates the samples and rapidly confirmed 
relatedness of cases in an outbreak at a food processing 
facility. This demonstrates the valuable role of large- scale 
genome sequencing of SARS- CoV-2 to inform surveillance 
and regional outbreak management.
METHODS
Samples
The clinical samples we used were initially collected passively 
for diagnostic testing with ethical approval from Public 
Health England (R and D ref. NR0195) and with sampling 
directed by government public health policy and local clinical 
need. Samples were taken at four large hospitals: Norfolk 
and Norwich University Hospital (NNUH) (1200 beds) in 
Norwich, Norfolk; The Queen Elizabeth Hospital (QEH) (500 
beds) in Kings Lynn, Norfolk; The James Paget University 
Hospital (JPUH) (500 beds) in Great Yarmouth, Norfolk; and 
the Ipswich Hospital (550 beds) in Ipswich, Suffolk. Addi-
tional clinical samples that were included were collected at 
five smaller hospitals; by three community care organizations 
(representing dozens of care facilities and GP practices); and 
at drive- through testing facilities for healthcare workers, 
essential workers (such as police) and their families who live 
or work in Norfolk and the surrounding areas (Fig. S1).
Samples and RNA extraction
Samples from cases with suspected SARS- CoV-2 were 
processed using five different diagnostic platforms over 
three laboratories on the Norwich Research Park: the 
Cytology Department and Microbiology Department, 
NNUH, Norwich, UK and the Bob Champion Research 
and Education Building (BCRE), University of East Anglia, 
Norwich, UK. Samples were primarily nasal/oropharyngeal 
swabs, although nasopharyngeal aspirates, bronchoal-
veolar lavage and sputum samples were also collected. 
The Cytology Department processed samples using the 
Roche Cobas 8800 SARS- CoV-2 system (https:// tinyurl. 
com/ yy58t8sp). The Microbiology Department processed 
samples using either the Hologic Panther Fusion System 
SARS- CoV-2 assay (https:// tinyurl. com/ yye3m25p) 
according to the manufacturer’s instructions, the AusDi-
agnostics SARS- CoV-2, Influenza and RSV 8- well panel 
(https:// tinyurl. com/ yyeh5y2w) or Altona Diagnostics 
RealStar SARS- CoV- s RT- PCR Kit 1.0 (https:// altona- 
diagnostics. com/ en/ products/ reagents- 140/ reagents/ 
realstar- real- time- pcr- reagents/ realstar- sars- cov- 2- rt- pcr- 
kit- ruo. html). RNA was extracted from swab samples in the 
Microbiology Department using either the QIAsymphony 
(Qiagen) or AusDiagnostics MT- Prep (AusDiagnostics) 
instruments according to the manufacturer’s instructions 
before being processed through the AusDiagnostics assay. 
In the BCRE, RNA was extracted using the MagMAX Viral/
Pathogen II Nucleic Acid Isolation kit (Applied Biosystems) 
according to the manufacturer’s instructions and the 
KingFisher Flex system (ThermoFisher). The presence of 
SARS- CoV-2 was determined on either the QuantStudio 5 
(Applied Biosystems) or Lightcycler LC480II (Roche) with 
the 2019- nCoV CDC assay (https://www. fda. gov/ media/ 
134922/ download).
Viral transport medium from positive swabs (stored at 
4 °C) was collected for samples run on the Roche Cobas and 
Hologic Panther Fusion systems and in all other cases excess 
RNA was collected (stored at 4 °C and collected within 
4 days for samples tested by the AusDiagnostics assay, while 
all other RNA samples were initially frozen and thawed for 
collection). Excess positive SARS- CoV-2 inactivated swab 
samples (200 µl viral transport medium from nose and 
throat swabs inactivated in 200 µl Zymo DNA/RNA shield 
and 800 µl Zymo viral DNA/RNA buffer) were collected 
from the Cytology and the Microbiology Department and 
SARS- CoV-2- positive RNA extracts (~20 µl) were collected 
from the Microbiology Department and the BCRE as part 
of the COG- UK Consortium project (PHE Research Ethics 
and Governance Group R and D ref. no NR0195), with full 
details in Tables S1–S3. For inactivated swab samples, RNA 
was extracted using the Quick DNA/RNA Viral Magbead 
kit from step 2 of the DNA/RNA purification protocol 
(Zymo - https:// tinyurl. com/ y2lqoneq).
SARS- CoV-2- positive samples were transferred to the 
Quadram Institute Bioscience for sequencing. The lower 
cycle threshold (Ct) or take- off value produced by the SARS-
 CoV-2 assays in the Roche, AusDiagnostics, Altona Diag-
nostics and CDC assays were used to determine whether 
samples needed to be diluted for sequencing according to 
the ARTIC protocol [for AusDiagnostics results, 13 was 
added to the take- off value to generate an approximate 
Ct value – this is because 15 cycles of PCR are performed 
before a dilution step and a further 35 cycles of nested PCR 
(the take- off value is determined in the nested PCR)]. The 
SARS- CoV-2 assay in the Hologic Panther does not provide 
a take- off or Ct value but rather a combined fluorescence 
signal for both targets in relative fluorescence units (RLUs), 
and therefore all samples tested by the Hologic Panther 
were processed undiluted in the ARTIC protocol.
Sequencing using ARTIC SARS-CoV-2 multiplex 
tiling PCR
cDNA and multiplex PCRs were prepared following the 
ARTIC nCoV-2019 sequencing protocol v2 [16]. Dilutions 
of RNA were prepared when necessary based on Ct values 
following ARTIC protocol guidelines. V3 CoV-2 primers 
(https:// github. com/ artic- network/ artic- ncov2019/ tree/ 
master/ primer_ schemes/ nCoV- 2019/ V3) were used to 
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perform the multiplex PCR for SARS- CoV-2 according to 
the ARTIC protocol [16] with minor changes. Due to variable 
Ct values, all RNA samples used in the two ARTIC multiplex 
PCRs were run for 35 cycles. Odd and even PCRs were pooled 
and cleaned using a 1× SPRI bead clean with KAPA Pure 
Beads (Roche Catalogue No. 07983298001), according to 
the manufacturer’s instructions. PCR products were eluted 
in 30 µl of 10 mM Tris- HCl buffer, pH 7.5, and cDNA was 
quantified using the QuantiFluor ONE dsDNA System 
(Promega). Libraries were prepared for sequencing on the 
Illumina or Nanopore platform and sequenced as described 
previously [17].
Sequence analysis
Raw reads were demultiplexed using bcl2fastq (v2.20) (Illu-
mina) allowing for zero mismatches in the dual barcodes 
to produce FASTQ files. The reads were used to generate a 
consensus sequence for each sample using an open source 
pipeline adapted from https:// github. com/ connor- lab/ 
ncov2019- artic- nf (https:// github. com/ quadram- insti-
tute- bioscience/ ncov2019- artic- nf/ tree/ qib). Briefly, read 
adapters were trimmed using TrimGalore (https:// github. 
com/ FelixKrueger/ TrimGalore) and aligned to the Wuhan 
Hu-1 reference genome (accession MN908947.3) using 
BWA- MEM (v0.7.17) [18]; ARTIC amplicons were masked 
and a consensus was built using iVAR (v.1.2) with primary 
parameters ‘ivar consensus -m 10 -q 20 t 0.75’ [19].
Quality control
Samples were prepared and sequenced in 96- well plates 
with one cDNA- negative control per plate and one RNA 
extraction- negative control, where applicable. Contami-
nated samples were removed from analysis (Table S2). The 
COG- UK consortium defines a consensus sequence as 
passing COG- UK basic quality control (QC) if: >50 % of 
the genome is covered by confident calls or there is at least 
one contiguous sequence of more than 10 000 bases; and 
no evidence of contamination in the negative control. A 
confident call is defined as having 10× depth of coverage. 
If the coverage falls below these thresholds, the bases are 
masked with the character N indicating the base at that 
position is unknown or not available. Low- quality variants 
are also masked with Ns. The QC threshold for inclusion in 
the public database GISAID (Global Initiative on Sharing 
All Influenza Data) is higher, requiring that >90 % of the 
genome is covered by confident calls and that there is no 
evidence of contamination. The COG- UK quality control 
criteria were used as the minimum requirements for 
lineage and phylogenetic analysis. Although we did not 
use a homoplasy- based test for batch effects as described 
previously [20, 21], a visual inspection of the consensus 
sequences for common SNPs across lineage boundaries 
for each batch is undertaken using snipit (https:// github. 
com/ aineniamh/ snipit). Additionally civet reports (https:// 
github. com/ COG- UK/ civet) are generated for each batch, 
with genomes from other labs included for context and 
are manually inspected. These reports identify for each 
generated sequence the closest sample in the COG- UK and 
GISAID databases, where in many cases identical samples 
sequenced by other labs are present. This helps to monitor 
for lineage altering artefacts.
Data availability
All consensus sequences were deposited in GISAID [22] if 
they met its minimum QC threshold. All raw sequence data 
and metadata [23] were deposited in the European Nucleotide 
Archive (ENA) [24]. In both cases this happened soon after 
sequence generation, facilitated through COG- UK, and using 
MRC CLIMB [25].
Clustering and phylogenetic analysis
Lineages [13] assigned to each consensus genome were 
determined using Pangolin (https:// github. com/ cov- line-
ages/ pangolin), which is run routinely by the Rambaut 
group over SARS- CoV-2 consensus sequences deposited on 
MRC CLIMB [25]. Global lineages are identifiers given to 
actively spreading lineages, are defined using a phylogenetic 
framework (https:// github. com/ COG- UK/ grapevine) and 
often represent distinct introductions into new territories or 
regions, taking the form B.1.2.3 (see Rambaut et al. [13] for 
full details). UK lineages represent the subsequent spread 
within the UK, taking the form UK1234 and providing an 
identifier for a cluster for a given phylogeny. Unlike global 
lineages, however, UK lineage identifiers are not consistent 
between phylogenies. In this paper, a sublineage is defined 
as a set of samples within a lineage which share a common 
history within this lineage. For example, if all samples 
within a lineage are represented on a phylogenetic tree, a 
sublineage would describe all samples derived from a single 
internal node. Only samples that passed COG- UK QC 
were considered for lineage assignment (>50 % of genome 
reconstructed), and only samples with more than 90 % of 
non- ambiguous aligned sites (i.e. not N) were included in 
the upstream phylogenetic pipeline.
This upstream analysis at MRC CLIMB (https:// github. 
com/ COG- UK/ grapevine) generates both the phylogenetic 
tree, aligned sequences and lineages (global and local) for 
most data. When adding more samples to the phylogenetic 
tree (as in the case studies below), we use IQ- Tree2 [26], 
first constraining the tree search to the upstream tree to 
create an initial tree, and then through unconstrained opti-
mization using default parameters and the HKY model [27] 
with gamma heterogeneity [28] in both cases. Sequences 
are aligned with MAFFT using Wuhan Hu-1 (accession 
MN908947.3) as a reference genome. Phylogenetic trees 
were visualized using ggtree [29].
Epidemiological analyses
Epidemiological analyses of outbreaks presented in the 
results were instigated and overseen by clinicians within 
the NHS or by public health bodies. Genome sequencing, 
bioinformatics analysis and genomic epidemiology were 
performed by Quadram Institute Bioscience with limited 
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anonymized metadata as part of the COG- UK consortium; 
patient- identifiable data were retained by the hospitals or 
public health bodies.
Longitudinal sampling and reinfection
For each case, the Norwich Research Park Biorepository (part 
of NNUH) anonymously linked all instances where cases were 
sequenced longitudinally (140) and provided the informa-
tion to Quadram Institute Bioscience for analysis. The UK 
lineages were extracted for each case with multiple samples 
using precomputed lineages from COG- UK. Consensus 
genomes which did not yield high enough quality genomes 
to compute a lineage were excluded. Cases which had more 
than two high- quality samples were validated to ensure the 
lineages were the same. Where differences were identified, all 
consensus genomes for the case were extracted into a FASTA 
file, and the differences compared to the Wuhan Hu-1 refer-
ence were noted using SNP- sites [30] (version 2.3.3).
Care facility outbreak analysis
An initial list of SARS- CoV-2 samples associated with a single 
care facility was provided by NNUH to Quadram Institute 
Bioscience. The UK lineages were identified for each sample 
using precomputed lineages from COG- UK. All other samples 
with the same UK lineage in the COG- UK dataset were iden-
tified and a phylogenetic tree was computed using IQ- Tree2 
under an HKY+G model, as described above [26] (version 
2.0.6). All samples in a sublineage associated with Norfolk 
were identified. The mutations defining this sublineage were 
calculated using SNP- sites [30] (version 2.3.3), with the 
Wuhan Hu-1 reference as the base. A phylogenetic tree of 
the sublineage was calculated before first removing singleton 
mutations, most of which were C→T/U SNPs, and are markers 
of RNA degradation. Anonymized care facility sample meta-
data were added to the sublineage, with the data visualized 
in Phandango [31] and the relatedness of the samples and 
care facilities was visually confirmed. Hospital admission and 
discharge data for the residents was analysed solely by Public 
Health England co- authors and an anonymized summary was 
provided for this paper to maintain patient confidentiality.
Hospital outbreak analysis
A list of SARS- CoV-2 samples associated with a hospital 
were provided by Ipswich Hospital to Quadram Institute 
Bioscience. The lineages were identified for each sample 
using precomputed lineages from COG- UK. The frequency 
of each lineage was identified for Ipswich Hospital. SARS-
 CoV-2 samples collected by hospitals (NNUH, QEH and 
JPUH) and care organizations in the same region as Ipswich 
Hospital had the frequencies of their lineages calculated in a 
similar fashion, providing context.
Food processing facility outbreak analysis
SARS- CoV-2- positive samples were sent to Quadram Insti-
tute Bioscience. Samples were prepared, sequenced using an 
Oxford Nanopore Technologies MinION and bioinformati-
cally analysed, all within 24 h of sample receipt. Consensus 
genomes were provided to Civet (https:// github. com/ 
COG- UK/ civet), which assigned lineages to each genome. 
SNPs defining the sublineage of the outbreak were manually 
identified from the Civet report. The global lineage where the 
samples fell into was analysed further. All public samples from 
the global lineage which were publicly accessible through 
GISAID were identified. The countries of origin and collec-
tion dates were noted. A phylogenetic tree of all samples in 
this lineage from May onwards was created using IQ- Tree2 
as described above. The SNPs defining the sublineages were 
calculated using SNP- sites (version 2.3.3).
RESULTS
Samples
The first reported case in the Norfolk region was on 6 March 
2020 from a returning traveller; by 31 August 2020, there 
were 3225 cases identified by NNUH from Norfolk and 
surrounding areas from a total of 3751 SARS- CoV-2- positive 
clinical samples (some cases were sampled multiple times). 
Of these, 1565 samples (41.7 %) were sequenced and analysed, 
from 1376 cases (42.6 %). This represents approximately 172 
SARS- CoV-2- positive samples sequenced per 100 000 popu-
lation. The sequenced cases were broken down by locality 
and age group (Table S4). For cases sampled multiple times, 
the earliest collection date of a SARS- CoV-2- positive sample 
was used for sequence analysis. These samples were collected 
in the East of England, predominantly from cases providing 
an address in Norfolk (Fig. S1). The samples came from 
Fig. 1. Total number of positive samples in the region per week, broken 
down by type. Not all of these were available for sequencing and a 
single individual may have been sampled multiple times. Staff (key 
workers) include healthcare workers and essential workers, such as 
police officers.
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individuals in the community (20.7%, n=285), inpatients 
(40.6 %, n=559) and outpatients (0.3 %, n=4) at hospitals, and 
staff (key workers) (23.8%, n=328) and their families (4.7 %, 
n=65) (Fig. 1). Inpatients represented a mixture of patients 
newly admitted to the hospital (with or without COVID-19 
symptoms), and existing patients with possible nosocomial 
SARS- CoV-2 infections. As testing was extended to more 
groups, so the regions from which samples were collected 
also changed (Fig. S2).
The number of positive samples in the Norfolk region peaked 
at the end of April 2020; specifically, the number of SARS- 
CoV-2- positive samples peaked in the week of 20–26 April 
2020, with 591 positive samples (Fig. 2). The peak month was 
April with 1992 positive samples, followed by May with 1188 
positive samples. These numbers include a small number 
of repeat samples. In July only 10 new positive cases were 
reported, before rising to 79 in August. More than 60 of 
the August cases were related to a food processing facility 
outbreak.
Proportionally, the number of SARS- CoV-2- positive samples 
that were sequenced followed the same trend as the total 
number of positive samples, peaking in the week of 27 April to 
3 May, with genomes from 320 cases being sequenced (Fig. 2). 
Although project sample collection for sequencing officially 
began on 8 April 2020, and no samples were sequenced from 
the period 27 March to 7 April 2020, 59 archived samples 
from March were available and were sequenced. Overall the 
number of genomes sequenced does reflect the number of 
positive cases in the region and we can confidently conclude 
that the peak period was April/May 2020, in this region.
The number of positive cases sequenced was greatest in older 
individuals, with the largest number of samples (n=316, 
36.5 %) being from cases aged 80–90 years (Fig. 3a). Just nine 
samples originated from cases under 10 years of age. Females 
were also significantly over- represented in the dataset 
(Fig. 3b), accounting for 57 % (n=741 out of 1286, P<0.001, 
one- proportion z- test) of cases. Virtually all samples made 
available for sequencing were sequenced, with no selection 
criteria based on patient data or quality cut- offs; while we 
Fig. 3. Age and sex of positive cases in absolute values (a) and scaled as proportions of all positive cases sequenced (b). Data from one 
person over 100 years of age are not included. NA, not available.
Fig. 2. Number of positive samples sequenced at Quadram Institute 
Bioscience (grey bars) over time compared with the number of samples 
collected (red dashed line). Project sample collection only officially 
began on 8 April 2020 and not all samples taken before this time were 
available for sequencing. However, archived samples for March were 
sequenced and are represented in this figure.
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cannot rule out differential submission rates of testing facili-
ties representing variations in patient populations, we thus 
generally expect the sequenced positive cases to reflect patient 




Samples received for sequencing varied substantially in 
viral load. For our samples the Ct correlated well with the 
percentage of bases missing in the reconstructed consensus 
genome (Fig. S3) with a substantial reduction in genome 
completeness for samples with a Ct above 32. Virtually all 
diagnostic positives were sequenced, irrespective of Ct value, 
to avoid underrepresenting patients with low viral loads. In a 
small number of instances [32] samples were not available for 
sequencing as there was insufficient material or the samples 
could not be found.
We identified potential biases in the quality of the genomes 
sequenced from samples. The sex and age of the cases (for 
those genomes which had the relevant associated metadata) 
were evaluated against four QC categories: not sequenced, 
failed all QC, passed basic QC and passed high- quality QC 
(Fig. S4). There were significantly more genomes from females 
in three QC categories (62, 63 and 55 % female in genomes 
failing all QC, passing basic QC and passing high- quality QC, 
respectively, one- proportion z- test, P<0.001), but not signifi-
cantly different in the not sequenced category (66 % female, 
P=0.052). With respect to an individual’s age, the mean age 
of individuals contributing samples that failed all QC was 
significantly higher (mean age 70.0 years vs. 64.9, 65.7 and 
58.8 years of age of individuals contributing genomes passing 
basic QC, passing high- quality QC and not sequenced, 
respectively, P<0.05, pairwise Kruskal–Wallis rank sum tests 
adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing).
Completeness of consensus genomes is related to the Ct of 
the input samples (Figs S5 and S6) and three temperature- 
sensitive ARTIC PCR primer dropout areas were visible [33] 
visible. A further three performed poorly at higher Ct values, 
due to reduced amplification efficiency, variation in which is 
to be expected in a large amplicon pool. Overall, the ARTIC 
protocol was robust and sensitive. Above Ct 32 the complete-
ness of the genomes recovered did begin to tail off and there 
was a substantial, largely random, drop off above Ct 35, i.e. 
there was no consistency in the primer pairs that performed 
well or poorly in the multiplex when there were <10 genome 
copies present.
In total, 901 samples (65.4 %) passed the GISAID QC criteria 
(≥90 % genome completeness), 120 samples (8.7 %) passed the 
COG- UK QC criteria only (≥50 % genome completeness and 
357 samples (25.9 %) failed (<50 % genome completeness).
Global lineages
As samples were collected over a 6- month period, the median 
number of SNPs per genome increased every month compared 
with the Wuhan Hu-1 reference (accession MN908947.3). 
When only considering high- quality consensus genomes (Fig. 
S7) it increased from six SNPs in March to 16 SNPs in August. 
The evolutionary rate was estimated to be ~2 SNPs per month.
The maximum number of co- occurring global lineages in a 
given week was 13 for the period 27 April to 10 May 2020, 
approximately 5–6 weeks after the UK government instituted 
a lockdown (23 March 2020) (Fig. 4). This rapidly reduced as 
the number of samples dropped.
When considering the number and proportion of 
co- occurring global lineages every week it is apparent that, 
during the peak (April/May), some global lineages became 
extinct and were replaced by new lineages, which rapidly 
increased in abundance (Fig. 5). The transient nature of 
lineages is exemplified in lineages B.1.1.3 and B.2. Lineage 
B.1.1.3 was first identified in the week beginning 4 May 
2020 (seven cases); it persisted for a month before becoming 
extinct within the region. Lineage B.2 was observed much 
earlier, in the week beginning 16 March 2020 (two cases), 
peaked 1 month later (19 cases) and was last observed on 
11 May 2020 (two cases). The small number of lineages and 
low case numbers in July and August coincided with a low 
instance of disease in the region, including a negligible level 
of hospital admissions for COVID-19.
The global lineage nomenclature system of Rambaut et 
al. [13] provides a flexible and consistent naming scheme 
for genomically detectable introductions of SARS- CoV-2 
into new locations; there have been 1035 global lineages 
assigned in this scheme. A total of 26 of these global line-
ages were observed in our data, 20 of which were observed 
in more than one sample. All of the global lineages present 
in more than one sample were from lineage B, which is 
Fig. 4. The weekly number of co- occurring global lineages, excluding 
lineages that were only found in a single sample.
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predominantly associated with European and UK outbreaks 
(https:// github. com/ hCoV- 2019/ lineages/ blob/ master/ line-
ages/ data/ lineage_ descriptions_ 2020- 05- 19. txt). A number 
of lineages were over- or under- represented in Norfolk 
samples compared with the UK and globally (Table  1). 
For example: B.1.1.15 was represented in 3.38 % (n=35) of 
Norfolk genomes compared with 0.97 % (n=60) globally 
(only 25 from outside Norfolk); B.1.11 was represented in 
10.72 % of Norfolk genomes compared with 1.34 % glob-
ally; B.1.5.5 was represented in 6.47 % of Norfolk genomes 
compared with 0.12 % globally; and B.1.75 was represented 
in 8.12 % of Norfolk genomes compared with 0.25 % globally.
The most commonly sequenced global lineage was B.1.1, 
which was present in 464 samples (44.8%) in this dataset and 
19 424 globally (31.4%); this lineage has three defining SNPs 
at 28 881 G→A, 28 882 G→A and 28 883 G→C and is closely 
associated with the European expansion of SARS- CoV-2.
Norfolk samples were set in context as part of the COG- UK 
phylogenetic pipeline (7 September 2020) using a phyloge-
netic tree based on all publicly released genome sequences 
(Fig.  6). Building phylogenetic trees with incomplete 
genomes is challenging [20, 34] in light of the low diversity 
of SARS- CoV-2 during the study period, with the genomes 
in the 50–90 % completeness range having a higher potential 
for misalignment and phylogenetic misplacement. Overall 
genomes from the Norfolk region represented a random 
sampling of co- occurring global lineages within the UK as 
a whole. Some major global lineages are under- represented 
in Norfolk such as B.1 and others are over- represented, such 
as B.1.1, when compared with the UK samples (Table 1).
UK lineages
Global lineages were further subdivided into UK lineages, 
to identify ongoing transmission and evolution within the 
UK. The numbers assigned to UK lineages are subject to 
change and must be recalculated for all genomes with each 
phylogenetic reanalysis. Thus, the numbers reported here 
are for a single phylogenetic analysis. Stable cluster iden-
tification and nomenclature for SARS- CoV-2 is currently 
an open problem, and thus all analyses in this paper were 
relative to a single snapshot, with consistent algorithm/
database/software versions, phylogenetic analysis and 
sample sets.
There were 100 UK lineages detected in the dataset, 49 of 
which were present in two or more cases. The number of 
co- occurring UK lineages peaked at 20 in the week of 27 
April 2020, approximately 5 weeks after the UK nationwide 
lockdown began; thereafter the number dropped to a single 
lineage in July and August (Fig. S8). The proportions of 
samples with particular lineages varied week to week (Fig. 
S9), with the most common UK lineage being UK5, which 
was present in 324 cases; this is also the most commonly 
identified lineage in the UK (https:// microreact. org/ 
project/ cogconsortium- 2020- 09- 02/ f5aa0bdd/). The next 
most common UK lineage was UK2913, which was present 
in 113 samples; this was a sublineage associated with care 
facilities in the region around Norwich city (detailed later).
Examination of the D614G mutation in the spike protein
There is evidence that a mutation in the spike protein of 
SARS- CoV-2 (an amino acid change from D to G at posi-
tion 614; D614G) increases infectivity of a pseudotype virus 
in vitro in cells; this is associated with an observed increase 
in viral loads in patients [35]. Overall, in the Norfolk 
dataset, 89.4 % (n=819) of samples had the D614G muta-
tion while only 10.6 % (n=97) had the wild type (Fig. 7). 
The relative proportion of the two genotypes differed over 
time. In March, 66.6 % (n=24) of samples contained the 
wild type and 33.3 % (n=12) contained the D614G muta-
tion. In April the proportion of genomes that were wild 
type had reduced to 10.7 % (n=47) while those with the 
D614G mutation were dominant at 89.3 % (n=392). In May 
the proportion of genomes that were wild type had reduced 
to 5.5 % (n=22) compared with 94.4 % (n=374) of genomes 
having the D614G mutation (Fig. 7).
Epidemiological case studies
Longitudinal sampling and reinfection
In August 2020 Quadram Institute Bioscience, at the request 
of the Microbiology Department at the NNUH, evaluated 
the genomes present in multiple longitudinal samples taken 
from the same case over extended periods of time during 
infection. The aim was to determine whether they were 
infected by the same lineage or different lineages, the latter 
Fig. 5. The proportion of samples represented by each lineage per week, 
excluding lineages represented by a single sample. Sample collection 
for sequencing began on 8 April 2020, and no archival samples were 
available for sequencing for the period 26 March to 7 April 2020. 
Samples from July and August were primarily repeated sampling of 
the same case or with only a single individual in a lineage.
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indicating potential reinfection. Longitudinal SARS- CoV-
2- positive samples were identified from 140 cases (Table 
S3), each with between two and six samples, 88.5 % of whom 
were hospital inpatients at some point during their illness. 
The median time span of the sampling was 13 days, with a 
mean of 16.2 days. The longest time span was 71 days, with 
22 cases having a time span greater than 28 days. The clinical 
outcomes were not available for analysis. Only samples with 
different collection dates from the same individual were 
considered. We limited cases to those with high- quality 
consensus genomes (passing GISAID QC) in two or more 
of the sample time points; this resulted in a series of longi-
tudinal genome samples from 42 cases; each series had two 
to four samples. In every example the lineage remained 
the same between samples from the same individual, with 
the exception of the linked samples NORW- ED449 and 
NORW- ECD30; this was because NORW- ECD30 had nine 
IUPAC [36] symbols for ‘partially’ ambiguous bases, which 
are likely to be due to differences in viral load between the 
original samples (Ct 17 vs. Ct 27). These results suggest that 
there is no evidence of reinfection in any of the individuals 
for which a series of positive samples had been taken.
Hospital outbreak analysis
In August 2020 Quadram Institute Bioscience and Ipswich 
Hospital used the genome data from a set of 31 samples 
from hospital patients to determine whether these samples 
represented a single nosocomial outbreak or whether they 
were unrelated and the result of community transmission. 
The 31 positive samples were collected between 6 March 
and 28 August 2020; 80.6 % (n=25) were from patients 
over the age of 65 years. From these, 18 yielded genome 
sequences of sufficient quality to assign lineages. A total of 
six global lineages and eight UK lineages were observed in 
the samples, with the most commonly observed (n=5) being 
UK5, which is also the most commonly observed lineage 
within the UK. This number of co- occurring lineages 
Table 1. Summary of the prevalence of global lineages represented by more than one sample in the Norfolk dataset compared with the public set of 
genomes from GISAID and COG- UK (accessed 28 August 2020)
Norfolk UKa Globalb
Lineage Samples Per cent Samples Per cent Samples Per cent
B 21 2.03 1021 2.59 1831 2.97
B.1 63 6.09 5918 14.99* 13 354 21.63*
B.1.1 464 44.83 15 654 39.65* 19 424 31.46*
B.1.1.1 11 1.06 3658 9.26* 3933 6.37*
B.1.1.10 6 0.58 295 0.75 324 0.52
B.1.1.15 35 3.38 45 0.11* 60 0.97*
B.1.1.3 19 1.84 100 0.25* 100 0.16*
B.1.1.7 2 0.19 157 0.40 173 0.28
B.1.105 7 0.68 90 0.23 90 0.15*
B.1.11 111 10.72 793 2.01* 825 1.34*
B.1.111 11 1.06 11 0.03* 18 0.03*
B.1.5 33 3.19 997 2.53 1996 3.23
B.1.5.5 67 6.47 73 0.18* 75 0.12*
B.1.75 84 8.12 152 0.38* 156 0.25*
B.1.88 6 0.58 39 0.1* 43 0.07*
B.2 51 4.93 1343 3.40 1792 2.90*
B.2.1 13 1.26 2004 5.08* 2153 3.49*
B.21 12 1.16 26 0.07* 27 0.04*
B.3 9 0.87 1000 2.53* 1118 1.81
a, In this column those values marked with an asterisk are significantly more/less prevalent in Norfolk samples than UK samples (P<0.05 
Bonferroni corrected for multiple hypothesis testing).
†‡b, In this column those values marked with an asterisk are significantly more/less prevalent in Norfolk samples than in global samples (P<0.05 
Bonferroni corrected for multiple hypothesis testing).
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Fig. 6. Phylogenetic tree of the Norfolk genomes sequenced in this study. The phylogenetic tree was estimated as part of the COG- UK 
phylogenetic pipeline (7 September 2020). The inner circle represents the UK lineages assigned to each sequence, while the outer 
circle shows their equivalent global lineages. Only high- quality samples are included (837 sequences). The tree is scaled by nucleotide 
substitutions per site.
Fig. 7. Weekly numbers of genomes with the wild type genome (D614) or the D614G mutant in the spike protein.
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indicated that there was not a single large nosocomial 
outbreak at this location.
Care facility outbreak analysis
In June 2020 the Microbiology Department at NNUH and 
Quadram Institute Bioscience evaluated an outbreak at a care 
facility in the Norwich region using SARS- CoV-2 sequenced 
genomes from the dataset in this paper. The analysis under-
taken indicated probable intra- care facility transmission, 
corresponding to a discrete sublineage circulating in the care 
sector as opposed to the wider community. It revealed that 
14 out of 15 genomes from cases had the same UK lineage, 
UK2913, over a sustained period of time (8 April to 1 June 
2020). An analysis of this lineage in all COG- UK data 
(n=395) revealed that it represented a distinct sublineage in 
the Norwich region of Norfolk, defined by a single synony-
mous mutation (A→G) at position 24232 in the S gene; this 
mutation was not found in any other COG- UK lineages. Most 
of the cases with this sublineage were >80 years of age and 
concentrated in distinct areas in the Norwich region. Analysis 
also confirmed that the samples were predominantly collected 
from six care facilities. There were 89 cases sequenced in the 
Norwich region with this sublineage and 76 of these were 
known to be patients (n=64) of care facilities or healthcare 
workers in those facilities (n=9) and their families (n=3). 
Links could not be established for 13 cases who tested positive 
for this sublineage. This sublineage had not been observed 
previously in community testing and the last new positive 
patient with this sublineage was on 1 June 2020. As it has 
not been seen in 3 months this sublineage is now regarded 
as extinct.
An analysis was undertaken to understand the role of hospital 
discharges in this sublineage. Of the residents in this sublin-
eage, 12 had a hospital admission, of whom two were admitted 
twice to three hospital trusts. Six had a community- acquired 
infection, testing positive within 7 days of admission, three 
were inconclusive due to missing data, one had a prob-
able hospital- acquired infection and tested positive within 
7 days of discharge, and two had a definite hospital- acquired 
infection (https://www. gov. uk/ government/ publications/ 
wuhan- novel- coronavirus- infection- prevention- and- control/ 
epidemiological- definitions- of- outbreaks- and- clusters- in- 
particular- settings). All residents with a hospital- acquired 
infection had a test prior to discharge, suggesting the package 
of infection prevention and control (IPC) measures were 
being followed. In the time period covered by the study, 
patients required a test prior to discharge to a care facility, 
and a positive test did not preclude them from returning to 
the care facility, but rather that enhanced IPC and isolation 
measures needed to be taken for a designated period of time. 
Given that some of this cohort of patients tested positive in 
May with community- acquired infections, a number of weeks 
after the adult social care IPC Department of Health and 
Social Care measures were announced, suggests that these 
measures may not have been sufficient.
On examination of all genome sequences obtained from a 
town with two of these care facilities, we found 70 samples 
were positive for SARS- CoV-2, with 52 of those yielding 
genome sequences of sufficient quality to assign a lineage. 
Thirty- seven samples (71 %) were associated with the care 
facilities and were the UK2913 lineage. The remaining 15 
samples in the town came from 13 different lineages, indi-
cating that the number of co- occurring lineages within the 
care facilities did not reflect the number of co- occurring 
lineages within the wider locality.
Food processing facility outbreak analysis
In August 2020, 35 positive samples from workers at a food 
processing facility were rapidly sequenced (<24 h) as part of 
an outbreak analysis by Quadram Institute Bioscience, the 
Specialist Virology Centre at NNUH, and Norfolk County 
Council Test and Trace and Public Health England. A total of 
27 yielded genomes of sufficient quality to assign lineages. All 
genomes fell within the same cluster with a global lineage of 
B.1.1.15 and a UK lineage of UK1361, confirming that these 
genomes were related to each other. The consensus sequences 
of the genomes in this outbreak had three SNPs defining a 
sublineage: U/T→C at position 7783, G→U/T at position 
25552 and G→U/T at position 28221. This sublineage had not 
been observed before in the Norfolk data, COG- UK data or 
global GISAID data.
Looking more widely at the lineage, it was only observed in 
samples from the UK, with seven other samples identified by 
community sequencing in July (15–27 July 2020). However, 
these seven samples lacked the three sublineage- defining 
SNPs found in the outbreak samples, and had two additional 
defining SNPs of their own (G→U/T at position 12067, 
G→U/T at position 28086). This indicates that these two sets 
of samples had a common ancestor and, based on an evolu-
tionary rate of ~2 SNPs per month, this ancestor might have 
occurred 1–2 months earlier. Ancestors of lineage B.1.1.15 
were only observed in Portugal in May and June (GISAID, 
accessed 27 August 2020).
DISCUSSION
Here, we have used intensive whole genome sequencing of 
SARS- CoV-2 samples in a single geographical area to investi-
gate the evolution and transmission of the virus in this region. 
The average age of the Norfolk population is significantly 
higher than that of England as a whole; 24.5 % of residents 
are aged 65 years or older compared with 18.4 % for England 
as a whole (https://www. norfolkinsight. org. uk/ population/, 
accessed 31 May 2020). The largest hospital in the region is the 
Norfolk and Norwich University Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust (1200 beds), serving a population of around one million 
patients from Norfolk and neighbouring counties, supported 
by a network of smaller hospitals.
There was a lower incidence of SARS- CoV-2 in the Norfolk 
region compared with England as a whole, with the propor-
tion of cases testing positive for SARS- CoV-2 in Norfolk at 
363.2 per 100 000 compared with 573.9 per 100 000 in England 
as a whole (accessed 14 September 2020, https:// coronavirus. 
data. gov. uk/). This was also reflected in the number of deaths 
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that occurred due to infection within 28 days of a positive 
diagnosis; for Norfolk this was 43.8 per 100 000 population 
compared with 65.7 per 100 000 for England as a whole, which 
is significantly below average despite having an older, more 
vulnerable population.
The sequencing data represented a rate of 172 sequenced 
genomes per 100 000 in the Norfolk population, which 
corresponded to 113.8 cases for which high- quality genome 
sequences were available for evaluation per 100 000 in the 
population. Specifically, we evaluated high- quality genome 
sequence for 31.3 % of all cases that tested positive for SARS-
 CoV-2 in Norfolk. However, as the samples primarily came 
from healthcare settings, they captured cases with the most 
severe symptoms rather than asymptomatic community cases. 
Only positive tests from the population with clinical need 
(primarily hospital and care facilities), and key workers and 
their families were available for sequencing. Community 
testing was done at large regional ‘Lighthouse labs’ capable 
of processing hundreds of thousands of samples per day. 
Most community testing required the case to have COVID-19 
symptoms, with the exception of population- level surveil-
lance, which made up a small proportion of positive cases. Of 
the sequenced community samples during the study period 
just 25 were attributed to Norfolk and lacked metadata, and 
thus were not included in analysis.
The highest number of positive samples in this region 
occurred at the end of April/beginning of May 2020, approxi-
mately 6 weeks after the UK instituted a nationwide lockdown 
(23 March 2020). Thereafter, the number of positive cases we 
sequenced dropped substantially as the impact of the lock-
down and social distancing began to reduce transmission. 
With the exception of the food processing facility outbreak, 
by August 2020, only two new cases with positive samples 
were detected.
Analysis of the demographic metadata associated with posi-
tive samples indicated cases were more likely to be older and 
female. This skewed distribution in relation to age and sex 
is likely to be due to the directed use of diagnostic testing 
to symptomatic cases during the peak of the pandemic; this 
approach was driven by global shortages in reagents and 
testing capacity. Thus, vulnerable elderly cases were more 
likely to be tested during the peak of the pandemic, and were 
more likely to be female as they have a longer life expectancy. 
Thereafter, when testing was opened up to key workers, they 
were predominantly female healthcare workers who make up 
77 % of the NHS workforce [37].
Viral RNA loads in individuals, as measured by PCR, were 
correlated strongly with the percentage of the genome that 
could be reconstructed from the sequencing data. This could 
be due to individual variation in host factors, disease stage 
[38] or quality of the sample material [32]. Phylogeneti-
cally useful genomes where the Ct was below 32 (more than 
~100 viral copies) were routinely sequenced but there was a 
substantial tail off from Ct 35. These results must be inter-
preted cautiously in terms of transmission potential, as it is 
not known whether an individual is infectious at low viral 
RNA loads; it is possible that the positive results from high 
Ct samples are due to detection of residual RNA from a past 
infection. However, this does demonstrate that sequencing 
can produce usable information from samples containing the 
wide range of viral RNA loads likely to be encountered during 
SARS- CoV-2 infections.
There is evidence that a mutation in the spike protein with 
an amino acid change of D to G at position 614 (D614G) 
increases the transmissibility of the virus, which is associ-
ated with an increased viral load in mutant- infected cases 
[15, 35]. This has been observed in the UK and globally [15], 
potentially indicating that a more transmissible strain is now 
in circulation. As seen in Fig. 7, in March 2020, during the 
early part of the pandemic in the Norfolk region, the wild type 
was found in the majority of samples (66.6 %), although the 
overall number of sequenced samples was low. However there 
was a rapid fall in the proportion of samples with the wild 
type in April (10.7 %), and by May 95 % of samples had the 
D614G mutation. This corresponds to a changing landscape 
of global lineages in the region, with an increasing dominance 
of B.1 lineages and sublineages, and a decreasing occurrence 
of other B (non- B.1) lineages.
The information provided by these sequences allowed an 
examination of the overall genetic variation within SARS-
 CoV-2 circulating in Norfolk and comparison with other 
regions. The number of co- occurring global lineages was 
similar to the range found within the UK as a whole [7], 
Europe [6] and beyond [39]. The notable exception was the 
lack of lineage A samples within the region, with only two 
being observed. This indicates that most of the lineages that 
entered the region did not come directly from China; rather, 
they are estimated to have predominantly come from Europe 
or within the UK. In the region, 23.2 % (n=26) of all global 
lineages were observed out of 112 lineages that have been 
defined to date [13]. This variation shows that genomically 
distinct lineages have expanded worldwide, with different 
distributions taking hold in different settings (see Microreact 
[40] https:// microreact. org/ project/ cogconsortium- 2020- 09- 
02/ f5aa0bdd/). The B.1.11 samples in our dataset were specifi-
cally associated with care facilities in Norfolk.
These data demonstrate a substantial number of co- occurring 
global lineages within one small region, indicating multiple 
concurrent introductions and their subsequent spread. This 
places a lower bound on the number of independent intro-
ductions to the region at 26, but it is likely to be substantially 
higher as not all COVID-19 infections were identified, tested 
and sequenced. As case numbers rose during the course of 
the pandemic, more lineages were identified, with a peak 
in the number of co- occurring lineages around 5–6 weeks 
after the UK instituted a national lockdown. Thereafter, the 
number of lineages dropped substantially, with many rapidly 
becoming extinct in the region, providing further evidence 
that lockdown measures break transmission.
By subdividing the global lineages into standardized UK 
lineages, a finer resolution of viral genomic relatedness was 
obtained and allows us to make more detailed comparisons. 
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As we observed with global lineages, the UK lineages 
provided further evidence for substantial viral genomic vari-
ability circulating in the region. There were 100 UK lineages 
observed in the region out of a total of 1725 lineages reported 
for the UK as a whole (5.7%). The dominant lineage in the UK 
(UK5) was also the dominant lineage in the region. Interest-
ingly, the second most commonly observed lineage in the UK 
(UK1535), with 2269 (5.7 %) samples and widespread circula-
tion around the UK, was only observed 19 (1.8 %) times in 
Norfolk (18 in this dataset, one sequenced by the University 
of Cambridge and none in Pillar 2 community testing for 
Norfolk).
One of the most important applications of these data was in 
epidemiological investigations to identify outbreaks. This 
was particularly important during the peak in April and 
May, when the number of new infections was high, providing 
the resolution required to distinguish between transmission 
clusters that would not have been otherwise possible. Our 
genomic data were informative in the following cases:
(1) In a hospital setting, lineage information was used to 
differentiate nosocomial from community transmission. 
We sequenced 31 samples from Ipswich Hospital and 
found eight UK lineages; the most commonly observed 
(UK5) was also the most commonly observed in the UK. 
This demonstrated that a single large nosocomial out-
break had not occurred but that the patients in hospital 
had become infected in the community by circulating 
lineages.
(2) Our data unexpectedly uncovered a sustained outbreak 
in six care facilities within the region. These data indi-
cated probable intra- care facility transmission and is 
currently under further investigation. The outbreak was 
identified while looking at a common lineage within 
the region and noticing that the positive samples had 
mostly come from elderly people, suggesting a possible 
link to care facilities. Further investigation at NNUH 
identified six care facilities sharing a distinct sublineage 
primarily found only in these facilities. This sublineage 
was not detected in community testing (Pillar 2) at any 
point. Only two cases were a definite hospital acquired 
infection with one probable hospital- acquired infection. 
Examination of all genome sequences obtained from a 
town with two of these care facilities showed there were 
13 different lineages circulating within the locality, but 
only a single lineage circulating in the care facilities.
(3) Rapid genome sequencing was applied to an outbreak 
in a food processing facility in the region, yielding line-
ages for 27 genomes in 24 h. Sequencing this subset of 
samples (about 25 % of positive cases detected) identified 
virtually identical genomes that were not found in the 
general community prior to the outbreak. This demon-
strated within- factory transmission of a new lineage. An 
additional G→>A mutation at position 20125 found in 
three of the outbreak genomes demonstrated that within 
the short period of time that the virus was circulating 
in the factory, some evolution with subsequent onward 
spread had occurred. As the lineage had not been seen 
in the region previously, we are currently monitoring for 
transmission from the factory into the community. The 
factory sub- lineage is sufficiently novel to link it to the 
factory if identified anywhere in the country. Looking 
more widely at all publicly available data in GISAID, the 
only other country in which this global lineage (B.1.1.15) 
was recently observed was Portugal between 6 May and 
14 June 2020 (the most recently observed genome from 
Portugal was from 22 June 2020). Genomics can be used 
to identify the possible source of a new introduction into 
a new area.
Samples could be broken down by the areas from which the 
samples were collected, representing towns or cities and their 
surrounds (Figs S2 and S10). Whilst UK5 was the commonest 
UK lineage in most urban areas in the Norfolk region, as it 
was nationally in the UK, there were other UK lineages that 
showed sustained persistence and spread within discrete 
communities from small geographical areas. UK2913 was 
primarily observed in Norwich and to the south and east of the 
city (South Norfolk, Waveney, Broadland, Great Yarmouth), 
nearly exclusively from clients of care facilities and healthcare 
workers at those facilities. Another UK lineage, UK721, was 
observed in seven community care residents (aged 78–92 
years) and two healthcare workers in south- west Norfolk. One 
lineage, UK173, was observed only in one suburb of Norwich; 
it dominated for 1 month (13 April to 19 March 2020), then 
went extinct and has not been observed in Norfolk since. 
This indicates that lineages introduced into small urban areas 
may expand but do not necessarily spread more widely. The 
UK6 lineage was primarily observed in the Kings Lynn area, 
accounting for 90 % (73/81) of UK6 samples in Norfolk. In 
contrast Norwich, 70 km away, recorded only a single case 
of UK6. These patterns are repeated throughout the dataset.
The number of co- occurring global and UK lineages in circu-
lation amongst inpatients (n=559, 22 global, 71 UK) was also 
reflected in key workers and their families (n=394, 19 global, 
49 UK). Sixteen UK lineages were observed in key workers 
and their families but were not observed in patients or in 
community care, though it must be noted that 10 of these 
lineages were only observed once. Four UK lineages (UK244, 
UK606, UK1049, UK1162) were observed three times each, 
and only in key workers and their families. As these lineages 
were not observed in hospitals or care facilities, it is likely 
that these key workers became infected in the community. 
It also indicates that these key workers were unlikely to have 
passed the virus to patients, providing evidence that infec-
tion control measures were effective in these cases. All UK 
lineages observed in household members of key workers 
were also seen in the key workers. Definitive confirmation 
of transmission, and the direction of transmission, cannot 
be inferred from the genome sequences due to the low 
evolutionary rate of the virus, which we have observed in 
our dataset as approximately two changes per month. Over 
time most lineages became dormant or extinct, with some 
expanding rapidly such as UK448 and then disappearing 
just as quickly over a 3- week period. Tracking lineages over 
time is an open challenge, with current methods requiring 
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continual reanalysis, which adds substantial complexity and 
a certain degree of uncertainly.
Caution must be exercised when making comparisons 
across different geographical regions, as the UK accounts 
for 64 % (39 483 out of 61 740 as at 1 September 2020) of 
all publicly sequenced SARS- CoV-2 genomes. Out of 103 
countries that have made SARS- CoV-2 genomes publicly 
available through GISAID, only the UK, Australia, Spain, 
India and the USA have sequenced more genomes than 
have been sequenced in Norfolk alone for this paper. The 
density of sequences when normalized for population size 
is 13 times greater in Norfolk than in the USA.
CONCLUSION
We provide an in- depth examination of the genomic epide-
miology of SARS- CoV-2 within a single geographical region 
covering the whole of the first wave of the pandemic from 
March to August 2020. We sequenced the genomes from 
172 SARS- CoV-2- positive samples per 100 000 population 
(1035 cases), representing 42.6 % of all positive samples 
collected through the Microbiology Department at NNUH. 
From this, we identified 100 distinct lineages in the region, 
corresponding to multiple parallel introductions of the 
virus (n≥26).
Dense sequencing of the virus provided actionable informa-
tion for pandemic management, including: identifying a 
sublineage associated with care facilities, ruling out a large 
nosocomial outbreak in a hospital, showing no evidence 
of reinfection in longitudinal samples, and confirming 
an outbreak at a food processing facility while allowing 
for spillover into the community to be monitored. These 
achievements were only possible through the collaborative 
efforts of scientists (data and molecular), clinicians, data 
managers and epidemiologists. The large- scale genome 
sequencing of SARS- CoV-2- positive samples has provided 
valuable additional data for public health epidemiology 
in the Norfolk region, and will continue to help identify 
and untangle hidden transmission chains as the pandemic 
evolves.
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